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REGULATING SERVICES THROUGH TRADE AGREEMENTS – A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY DISCIPLINES 
INCLUDED IN EU AND US FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
  
BILLY A. MELO ARAUJO∗ 
 
Developed countries, led by the EU and the US, have consistently called for 
‘deeper integration’ over the course of the past three decades  i.e., the convergence 
of ‘behind-the-border’ or domestic polices and rules such as services, competition, 
public procurement, intellectual property (“IP”) and so forth. Following the 
collapse of the Doha Development Round, the EU and the US have pursued 
this push for deeper integration by entering into deep and comprehensive free 
trade agreements (“DCFTAs”) that are comprehensive insofar as they are not 
limited to tariffs but extend to regulatory trade barriers.  More recently, the EU 
and the US launched negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (“TTIP”) and a Trade in Services Agreement (“TISA”), which 
put tackling barriers resulting from divergences in domestic regulation in the area 
of services at the very top of the agenda. Should these agreements come to pass, 
they may well set the template for the rules of international trade and define the 
core features of domestic services market regulation. This article examines the 
regulatory disciplines in the area of services included in existing EU and US 
DCFTAs from a comparative perspective in order to delineate possible 
similarities and divergences and assess the extent to which these DCFTAs can 
shed some light into the possible outcome and limitations of future trade 
negotiations in services. It also discusses the potential impact of such negotiations 
on developing countries and, more generally, on the multilateral process. 
 
                                                 
∗ Dr. Billy Melo Araujo, Lecturer, Queen’s University Belfast, School of Law. E-mail: 
B.Melo-Araujo[at]qub.ac.uk. The usual disclaimer applies.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1970s, services have increasingly become an important aspect of global 
commerce. In gross terms, services account for 23% of international trade and in 
value-added terms they account for a staggering 47% of world exports.1 It is no 
surprise then, that the removal of barriers to trade in this area has become a key 
priority, especially for developed countries that remain by and large the main 
exporters of services. However, tackling trade barriers in services is no easy matter 
since, unlike goods, most barriers to trade in services are not border measures such 
as tariffs and quotas but rather non-discriminatory domestic regulation.  
 
During the Uruguay Round Negotiations leading to the creation of the World 
Trade Organisation (“WTO”), the EU and the US were the principal proponents 
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”),2 and have continuously 
advocated further liberalisation in service sectors which represent key offensive 
interest (e.g., telecommunications, financial and transport services). However, with 
trade talks at the WTO level nearing a halt, both parties have been intensively 
pursuing a policy of concluding free-trade agreements (“DCFTAs”). The US has, 
since 2001, pursued a policy of ‘competitive liberalisation’ which has sought to 
                                                 
1 Hubert Escaith, Measuring Trade in Goods and Services, 1 INT’L TRADE F. 2 (2013). 
2 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter 
GATS]. 
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conclude DCFTAs with countries willing to open their markets and adopt US-style 
business friendly regulation.3 The DCFTAs concluded under this policy include 
the 2004 Chile-US FTA,4 the 2004 Singapore-US FTA,5 the 2004 Dominican 
Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement  (“CAFTA-DR”),6 
the 2005 Australia-US FTA,7 the 2006 Bahrain-US FTA,8 and the 2012 Korea-US 
FTA (“KORUS”).9 In 2006, the EU, initially reluctant to conclude commercially-
driven DCFTAs, notwithstanding a sliver of hope of a successful conclusion of the 
WTO Doha Development round, launched the ‘Global Europe Strategy’. This 
sought to conclude commercially-driven DCFTAs which would be WTO plus in 
character, and comprehensive both in terms of scope and breadth. To date, the 
EU has signed the 2008 EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement,10 
the 2011 EU-KOREA FTA (“KOREU”),11 the 2012 EU-Colombia and Peru FTA 
(“COPE”),12 the 2012 EU-Central America FTA (“EU-CA FTA”),13 the 2013 EU-
                                                 
3 Simon Evenett & Michael Meier, An Interim Assessment of the US Trade Policy of 
‘Competitive Liberalization’, 31(1) WORLD ECON. 31-66 (2008); Alberta Sbragia, The EU, 
the US, and Trade Policy: Competitive Interdependence in the Management of  
Globalization, 17(3) J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 368-382 (2010). 
4 U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 [hereinafter 
US-Chile FTA]. 
5 U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 
[hereinafter US-Singapore FTA]. 
6 Central American-Dominican Republic-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004, 43 
I.L.M. 514 [hereinafter CAFTA-DR]. 
7 U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248 
[hereinafter US-Australia FTA]. 
8 Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the 
Kingdom of Bahrain on  the Establishment of a Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Bahr., Sept. 
14, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 [hereinafter US-Bahrain FTA]. 
9 U.S. -Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Kor., June 30, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 642 
[hereinafter KORUS]. 
10 EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement, signed 15 October 2008, OJ 
L289/1/3, 30 October 2008 [hereinafter EU-CARIFORUM EPA]. 
11 Council Decision of 16 September 2010 on the signing, on behalf of the European 
Union, and provisional application of the Free Trade Agreement between the European 
Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, 
14 May 2011, O.J. (L 127) [hereinafter KOREU]. 
12 Council Decision of 31 May 2012 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, and 
provisional application of the Trade Agreement between the European Union and its 
Member States, of the one part, and Colombia and Peru, of the other part, 21 Dec., 2012, 
O.J. (L 354) [hereinafter EU-COPE FTA]. 
13 Council Decision of 25 June 2012 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of 
the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Union and its Member 
States, on the one hand, and Central America on the other, and the provisional application 
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Singapore FTA and the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement 
(“CETA”),14 all of which comply with the Global Europe Agenda. These DCFTAs 
contain comprehensive chapters on services which not only address discriminatory 
trade barriers but also include horizontal and sectoral regulatory disciplines, 
intended to iron out regulatory divergences which may inhibit market access for 
service suppliers. The culmination of such policies could possibly take the form of 
a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and the US - the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”), and even a plurilateral Trade in Services 
Agreement (“TISA”) both of which put tackling barriers resulting from 
divergences in domestic regulation at the very top of the agenda15 Should these 
agreements come to pass, they may well set the template for the rules of 
international trade and define the core features of domestic services market 
regulation. 
 
The purpose of this article is to address from a comparative perspective, the 
content of the regulatory disciplines in the area of services included in existing EU 
and US DCFTAs in order to delineate possible similarities and divergences and 
assess the extent to which these DCFTAs can shed some light into the possible 
outcome and limitations of future trade negotiations. Part II explains the rationale 
behind the inclusion of deep rules in the area of services as well as the multiple 
difficulties generally encountered in disciplining domestic regulation in trade 
agreements. Part III examines the GATS regulatory framework with a particular 
focus on provisions disciplining non-discriminatory measures. Part IV provides a 
comparative analysis of the regulatory disciplines typically included in EU and US 
DCFTAs. Part V discusses the extent to which new initiatives such as the TTIP 
and the TISA may build upon what is currently found in EU and US DCFTAs and 
draws some general conclusions relating to the impact of such agreements on 
services regulation at the multilateral level.  
 
 
                                                                                                                       
of Part IV thereof concerning trade matters 15 Dec., 2012, O.J. (L 346) [hereinafter EU-
CAFTA]. 
14 The negotiations for the EU-Singapore FTA and the CETA have been concluded but 
the agreements are yet to be ratified.  See European Union, Overview of FTA and Other Trade 
Negotiations, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/118238.htm (last updated Jan. 27, 
2015).  
15 Simon Lester & Inu Barbee, The Challenge of Cooperation: Regulatory Trade Barriers in 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 16(4) J. INT’L. ECON. L. 847-867 
(2013) [hereinafter Lester & Barbee];  Harold Godsoe, The Depth of the Trade in Services 
Agreement, 10(1) BYU INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 1, 16-18 (2014).  
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II. REGULATION OF SERVICES IN TRADE AGREEMENTS: THE 
RATIONALE 
 
Behind-the-border measures or domestic regulations, are typically the most 
important barriers to trade in services. Firstly, since services are largely intangible 
products, the imposition of border measures such as tariffs and quotas are in most 
instances not feasible.16 Secondly, most services are not delivered through cross-
border trade but rather through local presence of foreign service suppliers, foreign 
direct investment, movement of capital or labour and increasingly, via electronic 
means.17 However, the regulatory diversity and intensity that characterizes trade in 
services means that disciplining behind-the-border measures in services through 
trade agreements is no easy feat. Different sectors are regulated differently, and 
such rules will vary considerably from one country to another depending on 
societal, political, historical and cultural preferences.18 And, in most instances, 
services regulations are adopted to pursue a raft of wholly legitimate public interest 
objectives.19 For example, in network industries (e.g., telecommunication, postal 
and electricity services) anti-competitive safeguards are needed to curb abuses by 
natural monopolies and the imposition of universal services obligations ensure that 
the vital public services are delivered at reasonable prices to all users independent 
of their geographical location. Likewise, because of the information asymmetries 
that prevail between suppliers and customers with respect to certain services (e.g., 
health and legal services), the imposition of minimum standards of quality may 
often be required.20   
 
From a trade perspective, services regulations can represent up-front costs to 
market entry, such as licensing and qualification requirements, or seek to address 
                                                 
16 JOHN H. JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN SERVICES: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK 4 (1988); Juan Marchetti & Petros Mavroidis, What are the Main Challenges for 
the GATS Framework? Don’t Talk About Revolution, 5(3) EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 547 (2004). 
17 Philippa Dee & Alexandra Sidorenko, The Rise of Services Trade: Regional Initiatives and 
Challenges for the WTO, in RESHAPING THE ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC ORDER 206 
(Christopher Findlay & Hadi Soesastro eds., 2006); Panagiotis Delimatsis, Concluding the 
WTO Services Negotiations on Domestic Regulation – Hopes and Fears, 9(4) WORLD TRADE REV. 
643-673 (2010). 
18 Nicholas Diebold, Non-discrimination in international trade in services: ‘likeness’ in 
WTO/GATS (2010). 
19 Markus Krajewski, National Regulation and Trade Liberalisation in Services 11-19 (2003) 
[hereinafter Krajewski]. 
20 Carsten Fink & Marion Jansen, Services Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Stumbling or 
Building Blocks for Multilateral Liberalisation?, in MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM: 
CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 221 (Richard Baldwin & Patrick Low 
eds., 2009). 
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the operation and conduct of services suppliers who have entered the domestic 
market, such as competition laws and requirements pursuing equity concerns.21 
Historically, trade agreements have sought to address barriers created by such 
regulations by imposing national treatment obligations that require countries to not 
discriminate between domestic and foreign services suppliers or services. However, 
even in the absence of discriminatory treatment, mere differences in regulations 
between countries can create additional costs for foreign services suppliers that 
significantly inhibit market access.22 The EU, the most ambitious experiment in 
regional economic integration, applies an obstacle-based approach to services 
liberalization prohibiting non-discriminatory measures that affect or hinder access 
to markets in services.23 This approach also presents certain limitations, notably 
the fact that the prohibition is subject to multiple exceptions and derogations, 
which allow States to maintain trade restrictive measures.24 Beyond non-
discrimination and market access requirements, mutual recognition and regulatory 
harmonization are alternative tools that have also been envisaged to remove 
barriers created by domestic regulation.25 However, to the extent that services rules 
are a reflection of factors such as national preferences and the level of economic 
development, the regulatory approximation or convergence that is entailed by 
mutual recognition or harmonization arrangements are, in many cases, not only 
unrealistic targets but also undesirable.26 Moreover, since different countries have 
different regulatory needs, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to services 
regulation, which would automatically generate positive effects on a global scale.27 
 
In light of the limitations of traditional approaches to liberalising trade in services 
and the obstacles faced in pursuing regulatory harmonisation and mutual 
recognition arrangements, trade negotiators are increasingly resorting to alternative 
methods to address market access issues resulting from regulatory diversity. This 
includes, in particular, the establishment of formal and informal institutional 
processes that are intended to encourage cooperation, transparency and dialogue 
                                                 
21 KRAJEWSKI, supra note 19, at 13-16. 
22 Alan O. Sykes, The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonisation in International Goods 
and Services Markets, 2(1) J. INT’L. ECON. L. 53-57 (1999). 
23 Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments v Minister van Financien [1995] ECR I-1141; Case C–
518/06, Commission v. Italy  [2009] ECR I–3491. 
24 Gareth Davies, Trust and Mutual Recognition in the Services Directive, in REGULATING TRADE 
IN SERVICES IN THE EU AND THE WTO 102-104 (Ioannis Lianos & Okeoghene Odudu 
eds., 2012).  
25 Jacques Pelkmans, Policy Paper, Mutual Recognition: Economic and Regulatory Logic in Goods 
and Services, 24 BRUGES EUR. ECON. RES. PAPERS 5 (2012). 
26 Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: 
Governance Without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 287 (2005). 
27 Sykes, supra note 22, at 62. 
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between regulatory authorities in order to create trust between national regulators. 
By promoting “increased levels of institutional trust (or system trust) between 
actors across national boundaries”,28 these institutional mechanisms provide a 
forum for discussion and exchange of information in the area of services 
regulation which allow regulators to address each other’s concerns arising from 
regulatory diversity on a case-by-case basis and assess areas where regulatory 
convergence may be envisaged.29  
  
III.  GATS AND DOMESTIC REGULATION 
 
The inherent tension between trade liberalization and the need for States to 
maintain a degree of regulatory autonomy in services is evident throughout the text 
of the GATS.30 The recitals recognize the right of WTO Members to regulate and 
to introduce new regulations in order to meet national policy objectives.  These are 
national treatment and market access obligations. However, unlike the GATT 
system, GATS applies a positive-list approach to scheduling which means that only 
those sectors for which specific commitments have been made are covered by 
such obligations.31 Moreover, disciplines addressing non-discriminatory regulatory 
barriers to trade in services are few and far between. Article III, GATS, contains 
rules on transparency which require WTO Members to promptly publish all 
measures of general application that may affect trade in services and to establish 
enquire points that must respond to requests from other WTO Members for 
specific information on such measures. Article VII allows WTO Members to enter 
into mutual recognition arrangements as long as other members are afforded the 
possibility of joining such arrangements and that recognition is not accorded in a 
manner that would constitute a means of discrimination. But by far, the most 
ambitious provision relating to non-discriminatory regulation is Article VI, GATS, 
which contains procedural rules, as well as disciplines that may impact the content 
of domestic regulation.32 For example, with regard to the procedural rules, WTO 
                                                 
28 Ioannis Lianos & Johannes Le Blanc, The Trust Theory of Integration, in REGULATING 
TRADE IN SERVICES IN THE EU AND THE WTO, supra note 24, 46-52. 
29 Nicolaidis and Shaffer, supra note 26, at 317. 
30 Robert Howse, Importing Regulatory Standards and Principles into WTO dispute 
settlement: the Challenge of Interpreting the GATS Arrangements on 
Telecommunications, in REGULATING TRADE IN SERVICES IN THE EU AND THE WTO, 
supra note 24, 446-452.  
31 Patrick Low & Aaditya Mattoo, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Approaches to Liberalization 
under the GATS, in GATS 2000: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
449 (Pierre Sauvé & Robert M. Stern eds., 2000). 
32 Jan Wouters & Dominic Coppens, Domestic Regulation Within the Framework of 
GATS (Institute for International Law, Working Paper No 93, 2006); Panagiotis 
Delimatsis, Due Process and ‘Good’ Regulation Embedded in the GATS – Disciplining 
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Members must ensure that measures of general application are administered in a 
reasonable, objective and impartial manner,33 and that practicable judicial, arbitral 
or administrative tribunals providing the prompt review and appropriate remedies 
for any administrative decision affecting trade in services are instituted.34 With 
regard to the substance of domestic rules on services, Article VI:4, GATS creates a 
mandate for the negotiation of horizontal disciplines on domestic regulations that 
would apply across all services sectors.35 Such disciplines would require, inter alia, 
that measures relating to qualifications, requirements and procedures, technical 
standards and licensing requirements are based on objective and transparent 
criteria,36 not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service 
and in the case of licensing requirements,37 not in themselves a restriction on the 
supply of services.38 The obligation to ensure that measures are “not more 
burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the services” is potentially very 
significant. This is because it seems to espouse an obstacle-based approach to trade 
liberalization by imposing a proportionality or necessity test whereby measures 
covered under Article VI:4, GATS could be struck down if found to impose added 
regulatory burdens that are not necessary in order to ensure the quality of the 
service. To date, the WTO has encountered little success in developing such 
horizontal disciplines. First, in 1998, WTO Members negotiated disciplines on 
domestic regulation in the accountancy sector which included a requirement that 
domestic rules covered by Article VI:4, GATS are not more trade restrictive than 
necessary in order to fulfil a legitimate objective.39 However, the accountancy 
disciplines are not yet legally binding as they were supposed to enter into force 
after the conclusion of the Doha Round negotiations, which were suspended in 
2006.40 The WTO also established a Working Party on Domestic Regulation to 
negotiate cross-sectoral disciplines back in 1999, but progress in these negotiations 
has been slow, with considerable divergences persisting between WTO Members, 
namely on the issue of the operation of a necessity test with regard to non-
                                                                                                                       
Regulatory Behaviour in Services Through Article VI of the GATS, 10(1) J. INT’L. ECON. L. 
18 (2007). 
33 GATS, supra note 2, at art. VI: 1. 
34 Id. at art. VI:2. 
35 KRAJEWSKI, supra note 19, at 130-131. 
36 GATS, supra note 2, at art. VI: 4(a). 
37 Id. at art. VI: 4(b). 
38 Id. at art. VI: 4(c). 
39 WTO Council for Trade in Services, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy 
Sector, S/L/63 (Dec. 14, 1998). 
40 WTO Press Release, WTO adopts disciplines on domestic regulation for the 
accountancy sector, PRESS/118 (Dec. 14, 1998). 
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discriminatory regulation.41  
 
Finally, the WTO has also developed disciplines that apply to the financial and 
telecommunications sectors. With regard to financial services, there is the 
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services (“Financial Services 
Understanding”) which imposes optional enhanced national treatment and market 
access commitments to WTO Members, and the GATS Annex on Financial 
Services (“Financial Services Annex”), which includes a prudential carve out 
allowing WTO Members to derogate from GATS in order to adopt prudential 
measures such as measures ensuring the protection of depositors and the 
maintenance of financial stability. In the telecommunications sector, the WTO has 
developed the Reference Paper on Telecommunications Services (“Reference 
Paper”) – a unique GATS instrument in that it includes a number of pro-
competitive and regulatory disciplines that go beyond non-discriminatory 
concerns. It includes requirements to adopt anti-competitive safeguards, to 
establish and maintain independent regulatory authorities and transparent 
procedures for the granting of licenses. It also recognizes the right of WTO 
Members to adopt universal service obligations and imposes minimum standards 
regarding interconnection in order to ensure that new entrants to domestic 
telecommunications markets are able to access existing infrastructure networks.42 
In other words, the Reference Paper promotes a regulatory framework for 
telecommunications services based on principles of openness and competition and 
reflects, in particular, the experiences of developed nations in liberalizing the 
telecommunications sector in the final two decades of the twentieth century.43 
These regulatory principles, whilst broad, have the potential to significantly 
undermine the regulatory autonomy. For example, the requirement that 
interconnection rates be “cost-oriented” may undermine the ability of 
governments to apply additional charges to fund universal services obligations.44 
Likewise, the obligation to maintain independent regulators can be problematic in 
countries whose constitutions require parliamentary accountability of 
administrative bodies.45 However, the impact of the Reference Paper is lessened by 
the fact that it is a plurilateral instrument which provides a significant degree of 
                                                 
41 WTO Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation pursuant to 
GATS Article VI:4, Chairman’s Progress Report, S/WPDR/W/45 (Apr. 14, 2011); See also 
Juan Marchetti & Petros Mavroidis, The Genesis of the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in 
Services), 22(3) EUR. J. INT’L L. 689 (2011). 
42 WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications (NGBT), Reference Paper, ¶ 3, 
Apr. 24, 1996, 36 I.L.M 367.  
43 Andrew Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism: Re-Imaging the Global Economic 
Order, 285 (2011). 
44 KRAJEWSKI, supra note 19, at 176. 
45 Id. at 171. 
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flexibility for WTO Members. The regulatory principles included in the Reference 
Paper only bind WTO Members to the extent that they are included as part of 
their scheduled commitments. Moreover, WTO Members have the option to select 
which specific regulatory principles they wish to be bound by or even modify the 
Reference Paper in their commitments so as to reflect their particular interests and 
needs.46 
 
IV.  EU AND US DCFTA DISCIPLINES ON SERVICES: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
 
A. Domestic regulatory disciplines 
 
The disciplines on domestic regulation included in both EU and US DCFTAs tend 
to be GATS minus in nature in that they only replicate certain elements of Article 
VI, GATS. Whilst most DCFTAs include the administrative requirements of 
Article VI, GATS,47 the key obligations of Article VI:4, GATS aimed at ensuring 
that qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing 
requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services, are only 
partially replicated.  With regard to US DCFTAs, there seems to be a tendency to 
reproduce the text of Article VI:4, GATS in its entirety. For example, Articles 
8.8(2) of the US-Singapore FTA and 11.8 CAFTA-DR provide:  
 
With a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification requirements and 
procedures, technical standards, and licensing requirements do not constitute 
unnecessary barriers to trade in services, each Party shall endeavour to ensure, as 
appropriate for individual sectors, that any such measures that it adopts or 
maintains are: (a) based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence 
and the ability to supply the service; (b) not more burdensome than necessary to 
ensure the quality of the service; and (c) in the case of licensing procedures, not in 
themselves a restriction on the supply of the service. 
                                                 
46 Peter Cowhey & Mikhail Klimenko, Telecommunications Reform in Developing 
Countries after the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services 12 J. INT. 
DEV. 275 (2002). 
47 US-Australia FTA, supra note 7, at art. 10.7(1); US-Bahrain FTA, supra note 8, at art. 
10.7(1); CAFTA-DR, supra note 6, at art. 11.8(1); US-Chile FTA, supra note 4, at art. 
11.8(1); KORUS, supra note 9, at art. 12.7(1); US-Singapore FTA, supra note 5, at Article 
8.8(1); KOREU, supra note 11, at art. 7.23(1)(2); EU-COPE FTA, supra note 12, at art. 
132(1)(2)(3); For example, the obligation to ensure that measures of general application 
affecting trade in services are administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner 
or that, where an authorisation is required for the supply of a service, the competent 
authorities must inform the applicant of the decision concerning the application within a 
reasonable deadline. 
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Although the necessity requirement is included, the usefulness of this provision is 
limited in two regards. First, it merely creates a best endeavour obligation and, 
second, it does not expand on the manner in which the necessity test would work 
in practice.  In other words, the US DCFTAs do not create any additional 
obligations to what is already included under GATS. This is evidenced by the fact 
that these provisions are typically followed by a paragraph requiring the parties to 
amend the text of the FTA to reflect the results of current negotiations at GATS 
level.48  
 
The EU DCFTAs are even less ambitious than their US counterparts. The 
DCFTAs concluded with developing countries do not include the text of Article 
VI:4, GATS. Whilst the KOREU includes an Article VI:4, GATS-like provision, it 
omits the necessity test by not including Article VI:4(b), GATS obligation to 
ensure that qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and 
licensing requirements are “not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the 
quality of services”: 
 
With a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification requirements and 
procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute 
unnecessary barriers to trade in services, while recognising the right to regulate and 
to introduce new regulations on the supply of services in order to meet public 
policy objectives, each Party shall endeavour to ensure as appropriate for individual 
sectors that such measures are: (a) based on objective and transparent criteria, such 
as competence and the ability to supply the service; and (b) in the case of licensing 
procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the supply of the service.49 
 
Moreover, like the US DCFTAs, not only does the KOREU create an obligation 
of best endeavours, it also requires parties to incorporate the results of any 
negotiations at GATS level into the agreement.50 Therefore, generally speaking, 
both the EU and the US refrain from using their DCFTAs as an opportunity to 
develop new disciplines on domestic regulations and are satisfied to simply defer to 
ongoing negotiations that are taking place under the auspices of the GATS Council 
for Trade in Services and, more specifically, the WPDR. Departing from this 
                                                 
48 US-Australia FTA, supra note 7, at art. 10.7(3); US-Bahrain FTA, supra note 8, at art. 
10.7(3); CAFTA-DR, supra note 6, at art. 11.8(3); US-Chile FTA, supra note 4, at art. 
11.8(3); KORUS, supra note 9, at art. 12.7(3); US-Singapore FTA, supra note 5, at art. 8.8(3). 
49 KOREU, supra note 11, at art. 7.23; See  Eugenia Laurenza & James Mathis, Regulatory 
Cooperation for Trade in Services in the EU and US Trade Agreements with the Republic 
of Korea: How Deep and how Compatible? 14(1) MELB. J. INT’L L. 34 (2013). 
50 KOREU, supra note 11, at art. 7.23(4). 
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general trend, the recently concluded EU-Singapore FTA and the CETA include a 
number of disciplines on licensing requirements and procedures or qualification 
requirements which go beyond what is currently provided under GATS and which 
are the subject of current negotiations in the context of the WPDR. This includes 
rules relating the conditions and procedures for licencing and qualifications,51 such 
as the requirement that: (i) procedure and qualification requirements are “pre-
established and accessible to the public and interested persons”,52 (ii) that 
competent authorities must, within a reasonable period of time after receipt of an 
application which it considers incomplete, inform the applicant, and to the extent 
feasible, identify the additional information required to complete the application, 
and provide the opportunity to correct deficiencies,53 or (iii) authenticated copies 
should be accepted in lieu of originals.54 The significance of the approach adopted 
in these two agreements should not, however, be overplayed. Whilst the inclusion 
of the aforementioned obligations is a novel feature of EU DCFTAs, they remain 
largely unproblematic to the extent that the regulatory systems of both the 
signatories to the agreement already uphold such minimum standards. More 
significantly, neither agreement makes any mention of the controversial issue of 
the Article VI:4, GATS necessity test. In that sense, at least, the EU-Singapore 
FTA and the CETA can still be viewed as another example of the conservative 
approach adopted in EU FTAs towards disciplines on domestic regulation.  
 
B. Regulatory Transparency 
 
The regulatory and administrative transparency obligations included in EU and US 
DCFTAs typically relate to publication and notification requirements as well as 
minimum procedural standards in the context of administrative and review 
proceedings. Such transparency obligations are peppered throughout these 
DCFTAs, with some being horizontal requirements applicable to all regulatory 
areas covered by the agreement, whilst others apply only to areas covered by the 
services chapters or to specific service sectors. One key distinguishing feature 
between EU and US DCFTAs, however, is that the former imposes lesser 
transparency requirements with regard to developing country signatories whereas 
the latter does not differentiate between trading partners on the basis of their 
                                                 
51 EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 14, at art. 8.19-20; CETA, supra note 14, at art. X.2 
(Domestic Regulation). 
52 EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 14, at art. 8.19.1(c); CETA, supra note 14, at art. X.2(2)(c) 
(Domestic Regulation). 
53 CETA, supra note 14, at art. X.2(14) (Domestic Regulation). 
54 Id. at art. X.2(12). 
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respective level of development.55 Whilst the US tends to adopt a one-size-fits-all 
approach to transparency and regulatory cooperation by including GATS plus 
obligations in all of its DCFTAs, neither the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, the EU-
COPE FTA nor the EU-CAFTA go beyond what is currently prescribed under 
GATS. The analysis that follows will therefore focus exclusively on those EU 
DCFTAs concluded with developed countries, namely the KOREU and the EU-
Singapore FTA. 
 
With regard to publication requirements, the US DCFTAs go further than GATS, 
in that they not only enjoin the parties to promptly publish all measures of general 
application but also require them to establish, where possible, a prior comments 
procedure whereby proposed measures are published in advance and interested 
parties are allowed to comment on such proposals. In some cases the publication 
requirements are spelled out in more detail. For example, under the KORUS, the 
publication of proposed regulations must occur, where possible, at least 40 days 
before the date where public comments are due and must be done through an 
official journal and include an explanation of the rationale and purpose of the 
regulating.56 Likewise, the publication of the actual regulation must be done in an 
official journal and must include an explanation of the rationale of the regulation 
and address substantive comments.57 The KOREU and the EU-Singapore FTAs 
also include GATS plus obligations relating to the timing, means and content of 
publication. Although no time-period is specified, both agreements provide that 
publication must occur prior to the entry into force of the measure, in an officially 
designated medium and include a description of rationale and purpose of the 
measure.58 Like the US DCFTAs, these two agreements (as well as the CETA) do 
not require but rather encourage the parties to adopt prior comments procedures59.  
Article II, GATS also provides that WTO Members must promptly respond to 
requests for information of other Members with regard to measures of general 
application and establish specific enquiry points for this purpose. The US 
DCFTAs, the KOREU and EU-Singapore FTAs replicate the obligations to 
establish enquiry points and further provide that each party has an obligation to 
notify to the other party any proposed or actual measure which may affect the 
operation of the agreement or substantially affect the interests of the other party 
                                                 
55 Stephen Woolcock, Differentiation within Reciprocity: The European Union Approach 
to Preferential Trade Agreements, 20(1) CONTEMP. POL. 36-48 (2014). 
56 KORUS, supra note 9, at art. 21.2. 
57 Id. at art. 21.3. 
58 KOREU, supra note 11, at art. 12.3(1)(a); EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 14, at art. 
14.3(1)(a). 
59 KOREU, supra note 11, at art. 12.3(1)(a); EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 14, at art. 
14.3(1)(a); CETA, supra note 14, at art. X.01 (Transparency). 
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and, upon request, promptly provide information and respond to questions 
regarding an actual or proposed measure.60 
 
With regard to the conduct of administrative proceedings relating to requests for 
an authorization to supply services, Article VI:3 GATS currently provides that 
once a final decision is taken, WTO Members must inform applicants of their 
decision within a reasonable period of time. The US DCFTAs add, inter alia, that 
where such proceedings are initiated, each party must provide reasonable notice 
with an explanation of nature of the proceeding, legal authority and nature of the 
issue and ensure that affected persons are given reasonable opportunity to present 
facts and arguments.61 Article VI:2, GATS already provides that WTO Members 
must establish judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures which 
provide prompt review and adequate remedies for administrative decisions 
affecting trade in services. The US DCFTAs generally build on this obligation and 
add further requirements, inter alia, by requiring that the parties to the proceedings 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to support or defend their respective positions 
and that any ruling must be made on evidence and submissions.62 Out of the 
existing EU DCFTAs, only the CETA replicates the aforementioned due process 
and procedural transparency obligations whilst the KOREU adds to Articles VI:1 
and 2, GATS by requiring parties to issue a final decision on an application to 
supply services within a deadline of 120 days and, in the event where compliance 
with such deadline is not feasible, the decision must be made within a reasonable 
period of time.63  
 
C. Sectoral disciplines 
 
The services chapters in EU and US DCFTAs include subsections that deal with 
specific service sectors relating to areas of key offensive interests such as 
telecommunication, financial, and postal services. These sectoral provisions are not 
intended to create detailed regulatory frameworks but rather to ensure that 
domestic rules incorporate pro-competitive regulatory principles which place 
emphasis on non-discrimination, transparency and the implementation of 
competitive safeguards aimed at preventing abuses of market power.  
In the cases of financial and telecommunication services, these regulatory 
disciplines are borrowed directly from existing WTO plus rules that are yet to be 
                                                 
60 See, e.g., US-Australia FTA, supra note 7, at art. 10.8; US-Bahrain FTA, supra note 7, at art. 
10.8; KORUS, supra note 9, at art. 12.8; KOREU, supra note 11, at art. 12.4(1), (4); 
CAFTA-DR, supra note 6, at art. 11.7; EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 14, at art. 14.4(3), (7). 
61 See, e.g., KORUS, supra note 9, at art. 21.3; CAFTA-DR, supra note 6, at art. 18.4. 
62 See, e.g., KORUS, supra note 9, at art. 22.2; CAFTA-DR, supra note 6, at art. 18.5. 
63 KOREU, supra note 11, at art. 7.22(6). 
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multilateralised. Many of the FTA provisions on financial services are effectively 
taken from the WTO Financial Services Understanding and the Financial Services 
Annex. These include the prudential measures exception of the Financial Services 
Annex, as well as rules relating to new financial services and access to self-
regulatory organisations from the Financial Services Understanding. The DCFTAs 
deviate from the WTO texts in some instances. For example, with regard to the 
treatment of “new financial services”, the Financial Services Understanding 
provides that WTO Members must “permit financial service suppliers of any other 
Member established in its territory to offer in its territory any new financial 
service”.64 This means that a home State is required to allow the supply of a new 
financial service provided in the territory of another WTO Member even if such 
services are not provided in the territory of the former.65 However, both the EU 
and the US DCFTAs significantly reduce the scope of this obligation by adding 
that the supply of the new financial service is only required if the host State allows 
the supply of such service under domestic law.66 The upshot is that the FTA 
parties are not obliged to accept the supply of new financial products in their 
territories simply because their trading partners have decided to do so. However, 
the US DCFTAs differ from their EU counterparts in that they regulate issues that 
are not included in the WTO instruments. They generally include more detailed 
regulatory transparency requirements (e.g., prior comments procedures),67 as well 
as provisions prohibiting laws that require financial institutions to only engage 
individuals of any particular nationality as senior managerial or other essential 
personnel, or those that require that more than a minority of the board of directors 
of a financial institution be composed of nationals.68 The CETA represents a 
minor departure from the EU’s existing practice, in that it adds certain provisions 
that are not found in any existing WTO instrument. There are, for example, rules 
                                                 
64 Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, Uruguay Round Final Act, GATT 
Trade Negotiations Committee Document MTN/FA II-AIB, General Agreement on 
Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994 at ¶ 7. 
65 Christian Tietje, Jasper Finke & Diemo Dietrich, Liberalization and Rules on Regulation 
in the Field of Financial Services in Bilateral Trade and Regional Integration Agreements 
30 (2010). 
66 See, e.g., US-Australia FTA, supra note 7, at art. 13.6; US-Bahrain FTA, supra note 7, at art. 
11.6; CAFTA-DR, supra note 6, at art. 12.6; KORUS, supra note 9, at art. 13.6; US-
Singapore FTA, supra note 5, at art. 10.6; EU-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 10, at art. 
15.6; KOREU, supra note 11, at art. 7.42; EU-COPE FTA, supra note 12, at art. 156; EU-
CAFTA, supra note 13, at art. 197; EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 14, at art. 8.53; CETA, 
supra note 14, at art. 13 (Financial Services). 
67 See, e.g., US-Australia FTA, supra note 7, at art. 13.11; KORUS, supra note 9, at art. 13.11; 
US-Singapore FTA, supra note 5, at art. 10.11. 
68 See, e.g., US-Australia FTA, supra note 7, at art. 13.12; KORUS, supra note 9, at art. 13.8; 
US-Singapore FTA, supra note 5, at art. 10.8. 
408                                       Trade, Law and Development                                          [Vol. 6: 393 
on the composition of senior management and board of directors of financial 
institutions69 and the establishment of prior comments procedures.70 Furthermore, 
any violations of the provisions on financial services are covered by the Investor-
to-State dispute settlement mechanism established by the agreement.71 Such 
provisions are very similar to those typically included in the US DCFTAs, 
something that can be explained by the fact that Canada, as a member of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), tends to follow the US FTA 
model. 
 
Nevertheless to the extent that these DCFTAs generally follow the template set by 
the Financial Services Annex, they are unlikely to represent a significant restriction 
on the regulatory space of the parties. In fact, with regard to financial services, the 
most contentious aspect of modern DCFTAs may be found outside the services 
chapters and relate to the capital account liberalisation provisions requiring parties 
to ensure that capital flows freely between them. Under GATS and most DCFTAs, 
this requirement is tempered both by the prudential measures exception and a 
balance of payments safeguard clause. This permits governments to adopt or 
maintain restrictions on payments and transactions relating to scheduled services 
where it is shown that the unrestricted movement of capital could cause serious 
economic or financial disruption. However, the US generally omits balance of 
payment safeguards from its texts, meaning that the parties are unable to impose 
restrictions on trade in order to address critical macro-economic problems.72  
 
The disciplines on telecommunication services are also based on existing WTO 
rules.  Both the EU and US DCFTAs reproduce large portions of the GATS 
Reference Paper on telecommunication services which includes provisions 
regulating interconnection, competitive safeguards, allocation of scarce resources, 
the status of regulatory authorities and the provision of universal services. In doing 
so, the DCFTAs remove the flexibility provided in the context of the WTO where 
Members are not only free to decide whether to be bound by the Reference Paper, 
but also to pick and choose which parts to comply with.73 This is particularly 
problematic for developing countries since the Reference Paper, as discussed 
                                                 
69 CETA, supra note 14, at art. 8 (Financial Services). 
70 Id. at art. 10. 
71 Id. at art. 20. 
72 Kevin Gallagher, Capital account regulations and the trading system, in REGULATING 
GLOBAL CAPITAL FLOWS FOR LONG-RUN DEVELOPMENT 120 (2012); Jane Kelsey, How 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Could Heighten Financial Instability and 
Foreclose Governments' Regulatory Space, 8(3) NZYIL 3 (2010). 
73 Cowhey & Klimenko, supra note 46. 
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already,74 includes requirements that can restrict the ability of governments to 
pursue legitimate policy objectives. The US DCFTAs include rules on number 
portability, access to unbundled network elements, resale of telecommunication 
services, provisioning and leasing of circuits services, co-location, and access to 
submarine cables, transparency and so forth. On the other hand, the EU DCFTAs 
have been more modest in their approach by generally focusing on providing 
further guidance on issues already covered in the Reference Paper such as licensing 
rules, interconnection, operation of regulatory authorities and confidentiality of 
traffic data. However, it should be noted that in its most recent DCFTAs – the 
EU-Singapore FTA and the CETA – the EU has embraced the more 
comprehensive approach adopted by US DCFTAs by including additional rules on 
transparency, independence of regulatory authorities, co-location, number 
portability and confidentiality of information obtained in the process of negotiating 
interconnection agreements.75 Here again, the creeping influence of the US FTA 
model can be attributed to the fact that both Canada and Singapore have signed 
DCFTAs with the US. 
 
In both financial and telecommunications services, it can be said that the EU and 
the US are using their FTAs to expand the reach of plurilateral WTO rules. As 
regards disciplines on service sectors for which there are no corresponding deep 
rules at WTO level, the US usually includes provisions that are intended to provide 
a general framework for domestic regulation on electronic commerce. These 
include, for example, general requirements to ensure that domestic rules are based 
on the UNCITRAL Model Law on electronic communications or more specific 
obligations relating to consumer protection, data protection and authentication, 
and digital signatures.76 The EU DCFTAs contain provisions regulating postal and 
courier services, computer services, international maritime services and electronic 
commerce. In some cases such provisions focus exclusively on issues of market 
access (computer and international services), whilst others go no further than 
establishing regulatory cooperation processes (electronic commerce). However, the 
EU DCFTAs contain sections on postal and courier services which aim to 
replicate the pro-competitive disciplines included in the Reference Paper on 
Telecommunications, including provisions that prohibit anti-competitive practices, 
allow the imposition of universal services obligations and require procedural 
guarantees in licensing procedures and the establishment of independent regulatory 
                                                 
74 See supra, Part III. 
75 EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 14, at art. 8.24-8.49; CETA, supra note 14, at art. 17:2-
17.13. 
76 Sacha Wunsch-Vincent & Arno Hold, Towards Coherent Rules for Digital Trade: Building on 
Efforts in Multilateral Versus Preferential Trade Negotiations, in TRADE GOVERNANCE IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE: WORLD TRADE FORUM 206 (Mira Burri & Thomas Cottier eds., 2012). 
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authorities. The EU-CARIFORUM EPA also provides competition law 
requirements that must be imposed in the tourism sector, namely prohibitions of 
any “abuse of dominant position through imposition of unfair prices, exclusivity 
clauses, refusal to deal, tied sales, quantitative restrictions or vertical integration”.77 
Such provisions are a unique feature in the FTA landscape and were introduced at 
the specific request of CARIFORUM States, keen on ensuring that the larger EU 
service suppliers were not able to engage in unfair practices which would 
undermine the ability of CARIFORUM firms to participate in the market.78  
 
V. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
 
A. The TTIP and TISA as tools to reshape global trade governance 
 
On 21 February 2013, the EU and the US announced their decision to launch 
bilateral negotiations for the conclusion of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). The move signalled something of a departure from the EU’s 
previous trade policy, which had targeted trade deals with emerging economies not 
only to remove barriers to fast-growing markets, but also to find common ground 
with countries that have been ringleaders of the opposition to the developed 
country proposals made during the Doha Development Round. This shift towards 
traditional economic powerhouses can be attributed in part to the EU’s struggles 
to make much headway in negotiations with India and Mercosur, but it is also, in 
part, a response to the US’s ‘pivot’ towards Asia and, in particular, the ongoing 
negotiations of the TransPacific Partnership (“TPP”), a trade agreement 
encompassing countries from the Asia-Pacific region (Australia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, the US and Vietnam).79 The negotiation of the TPP is problematic for 
the EU, not only because it could lead to EU firms being discriminated against in 
the lucrative markets covered by the projected agreement, but also because the 
rules enshrined in the TPP could possibly be held as a model to be emulated in 
future DCFTAs.80 Therefore, the TTIP (as well as the recent EU-Japan FTA 
negotiations) has significant geopolitical implications for the EU. It is as much 
about market access as it is an opportunity for the EU to influence and develop the 
                                                 
77 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 10, at art. 127.1. 
78 Pierre Sauvé & Natasha Ward, The EC-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement: 
Assessing the Outcome on Services and Investment 42-43 (European Centre for International 
Political Economy (ECIPE) Working Paper Series, 2009) [hereinafter Sauvé & Ward]. 
79 Patrick Messerlin, The EU’s Strategy for Trans-Pacific Partnership, 28(2) J. ECON. 
INTEGRATION 285-302 (2013). 
80 Patrick Messerlin, The Much Needed EU Pivoting to East Asia, 10(2) ASIA PACIFIC J. EU 
STUD. 13-14 (2012). 
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rules of trade, which are increasingly being set outside of the multilateral context 
through mega-regional trade deals. In other words, the key objective of the TTIP is 
to set the future rules of global commerce. Commissioner de Gucht admitted as 
much by recognising that the EU’s ambition is to “help shape the global rules of 
trade”.81  
 
The EU and the US have similarly been the main proponents of negotiations on 
the Trade in Services Agreement (“TISA”),82 which was borne out of the 
increasing frustration felt by WTO Members with respect to the paralysis currently 
gripping trade in services negotiations at the multilateral level. Since 2013, these 
two economic powers, along with 21 other developed country WTO Members (so 
called “Really Good Friends”) have thus sought to negotiate this plurilateral 
agreement which is intended to cover all service sectors and pursue both market 
opening and the establishment of regulatory disciplines. Although negotiations are 
currently being conducted outside of the auspices of the WTO, the agreement is 
open to all other WTO Members with the hope that the results of the negotiations 
will eventually be incorporated into the GATS.83 Therefore, like the TTIP, the 
TISA must be understood in the context of the EU and the US’s ongoing attempts 
to reform global trade governance by concluding mega-trade deals with like-
minded trade powers. 
 
B. TTIP and services regulation 
 
Much has been made of the desire to use the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (“TTIP”) to reduce regulatory barriers. However, none of the policy 
statements issued from either side of the pond reveal any intent to address the 
problematic GATS issues relating to non-discriminatory regulation.84 There is no 
mention of the possibility of using the TTIP to explore horizontal disciplines on 
                                                 
81 European Commission, Statement by EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht on the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) ahead of the second round of 
negotiations (Sept. 30, 2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=969.  
82 European Commission, European Commission Proposes to Open Plurilateral Trade 
Negotiations on Services (Feb. 15, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-
118_en.htm; USTR, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk Notifies Congress of Intent to 
Negotiate New International Trade Agreement on Services (Jan. 15, 2013), 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/january/ustr-kirk-
notifies-congress-new-itas-negotiations.  
83 Sauvé & Ward, supra note 78. 
84 European Commission, EU – US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Trade 
Cross-Cutting Disciplines and Institutional Provisions, Initial EU Position Paper 
[hereinafter European Commission, (2013a)]; Dan Mullaney, Opening Remarks by U.S. 
and EU Chief Negotiators for T-TIP Round Seven Press Conference (Oct. 3, 2014). 
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domestic regulation of the type envisaged under Article V:4, GATS, and little 
evidence that the parties intend to develop common regulatory disciplines on 
specific sectors. This approach is not entirely surprising with regard to the issue of 
horizontal disciplines, the rationale being that despite negotiations since 2005, 
significant divergences persist at the multilateral level “on important and basic 
issues”, not least regarding the desirability and the operation of a necessity test.85 
With regard to regulatory disciplines in sector specific areas, the current practice of 
including broad regulatory principles in DCFTAs seems somehow redundant in 
the case of the TTIP, to the extent that both jurisdictions already have transparent 
and pro-competitive regulatory systems in place that go beyond anything currently 
required under WTO law.  
 
Emphasis has instead been placed on the importance of regulatory cooperation as 
a tool to remove regulatory divergences. The negotiators of the TTIP have thus 
proposed the adoption of enhanced transparency rules and the establishment of 
institutional mechanisms promoting regulatory dialogue.86 This includes, for 
example, requirements to notify proposed regulations, to implement prior 
comments procedures and to facilitate exchange of data,87 as well as creation of an 
institutional body entrusted with the task of assessing the feasibility of 
implementing regulatory harmonisation, compatibility and mutual recognition 
arrangements.88 There have also been proposals to establish regulatory cooperation 
on specific service sectors, most controversially in the area of financial services, 
where the EU would like to establish an institutional process through which the 
parties would work to ensure the “timely and consistent” implementation of 
international standards, conduct mutual consultations in advance of new financial 
measures that may impact on the supply of financial services, examine where 
existing rules may constitute unnecessary barriers to trade and assess the extent to 
which their respective rules on financial services are equivalent in outcomes.89 The 
principle objective of such cooperative format for the EU would be to explore the 
possibility of securing recognition of equivalence in financial standards so as to 
ensure that EU service suppliers are not subject to the cumbersome US prudential 
                                                 
85 WTO, World Trade Report: The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-
Existence to Coherence (2011). 
86 European Commission, (2013a), supra note 84. 
87 Lester & Barbee, supra note 15. 
88 European Commission, (2013a), supra note 84. 
89 European Commission, Cooperation on Financial Services Regulation (Jan. 27, 2014), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/january/tradoc_152101.pdf [hereinafter 
European Commission, (2013b)]. 
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regulations that have followed the Dodd-Frank Act.90 So far, the EU’s proposal 
has been met with little interest on the part of US trade officials, who fear that a 
binding cooperative framework may hamper the ongoing reform of the US 
financial regulatory system or even be used to water down existing standards, and 
have stressed that any discussion on financial services regulation is off the 
negotiating table.91 In other words, there are limits to how far DCFTAs can go in 
disciplining domestic regulation in the area of services. As the case of financial 
services in the TTIP illustrates, even in the context of negotiations between like-
minded trade powers such as the EU and the US, the regulatory mistrust that 
persists between nations renders any proposal for regulatory convergence or 
significant cooperation a difficult sell. 
 
C. TISA: The plurilateralisation of FTA disciplines on domestic regulation 
 
The TISA is being envisaged as an opportunity to disseminate the types of 
disciplines typically included in EU and US DCFTAs. The EU has already stated 
that it intends to include disciplines on issues such as “independence of regulators, 
fair authorisation processes or non-discriminatory access to […] networks”,92 in 
the context of services sectors such as telecommunications, financial services or 
postal and courier services. In addition, the EU has revealed that negotiators would 
consider developing disciplines on international maritime transport, 
telecommunication services, e-commerce, computer related services, cross-border 
data transfers, postal and courier services, financial services, temporary movement 
of natural persons, government procurement of services, export subsidies and 
state-owned enterprises.93 
 
Clearly then, the proponents of the TISA are not proposing the development of 
horizontal regulatory disciplines, which have proved so elusive in the context of 
the WTO. Rather, the agreement would seek to replicate the type of sector specific 
disciplines typically found in the most recent EU and US DCFTAs and expand 
their application to other services sectors (especially network industries).94 This 
appears to be confirmed by the EU’s proposal for an annex on financial services 
                                                 
90 Simon Johnson & Jeffrey Schott, Financial Services in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership 4, 5 (Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Briefs PB13-26, 
2013). 
91 Shawn Donnan, EU-US trade talks hit roadblock over financial services, FINANCIAL 
TIMES, (June 16, 2014). 
92 European Commission, (2013a), supra note 84, at 2. 
93 Id.  
94 Pierre Sauvé, A Plurilateral Agenda for Services? Assessing the case for a Trade in 
Services Agreement (NCCR Trade Regulation, Working Paper No 2013/29, May 2013).  
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which follows the template set in it DCFTAs by copy pasting large swathes of the 
Reference Paper and the Financial Services Understanding with a few deviations 
and additions in certain areas (e.g., new financial services, transparency 
requirements, etc).95 The objectives pursued by the TISA are, therefore, not too 
dissimilar to those currently pursued by the EU and the US in their DCFTAs, 
confirming the suspicions that these economic powerhouses are simultaneously 
using bilateral and plurilateral initiatives to impose rules for which there is no 
consensus at the multilateral level. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has attempted to provide a general overview of the provisions 
disciplining domestic services regulation included in EU and US DCFTAs. The 
discussion has been deliberately descriptive with a view to highlight the very similar 
and increasingly converging approaches adopted by these two trade powers in their 
respective DCFTAs in relation to services. In general, whilst mostly GATS plus in 
nature, these DCFTAs do not represent a significant departure from the GATS 
framework, in that they focus mostly on non-discrimination and market access 
concerns. However, with regard to deep regulatory disciplines, although they 
eschew the controversial and unresolved issue of horizontal disciplines on 
domestic regulation, EU and US DCFTAs are increasingly focused on enhancing 
regulatory transparency and expanding the reach of the pro-competitive regulatory 
principles enshrined in plurilateral GATS instruments on financial and 
telecommunication services. More recent DCFTAs, and especially those concluded 
by the EU, have ventured into other services sectors and areas such as postal and 
courier services and tourism.  
 
The current approach adopted in the DCFTAs covered in this article is beneficial 
in obvious ways. First, deep disciplines designed to ensure fair competition, 
transparency and the rule of law in the context of administrative and judicial 
proceedings, apply on a non-discriminatory basis, meaning they will not be of 
benefit only to nationals of the FTA parties but any person doing business within 
those territories. Second, the practice of replicating disciplines included in WTO 
texts can only serve to further reinforce the multilateral system and even create 
common ground for future multilateral negotiations. Of course, the flipside to this 
argument is that by resorting to DCFTAs, the EU and the US are using their 
increased leverage in the context of bilateral negotiations to impose disciplines that 
they would have otherwise not have been able to in a multilateral context. In this 
sense, at least, the current drive by large economic powers to include GATS plus 
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provisions in DCFTAs is clearly a strategy to bypass a stalling multilateral process. 
This is evidenced in the area of services where the similarity between the content 
of DCFTAs and the proposals for the TISA show that not only are DCFTAs used 
to consolidate and expand existing deep WTO rules but also to develop new 
disciplines which can then be transposed into the plurilateral agreements and, 
eventually, the multilateral arena.  
 
A key related question deserving further attention relates to the desirability and 
impact of such disciplines on the regulatory autonomy of FTA signatories. Here, it 
should be noted that the vast majority of regulatory disciplines included in 
DCFTAs covered by this paper are intended to ensure that the liberalisation 
commitments made by countries are not undone by overly burdensome and 
opaque non-discriminatory domestic regulation. Furthermore, because the 
regulatory principles included in the DCFTAs generally tend to be the broadly 
termed, the parties maintain a considerable margin of discretion in terms of how to 
implement such principles.96 Nevertheless, the article has highlighted some areas 
of concern for developing countries, notably with regard to financial and 
telecommunication services. Therefore, in their attempts to expand and further 
develop the FTA regulatory disciplines in the area of services, the EU and the US 
must give more thought to the potential impact of such disciplines on developing 
nations and not just assume that these will inevitably be beneficial to all involved. 
In this respect, it is well established that even where there is ample evidence 
indicating that the pro-competitive disciplines are necessary in order to maximise 
the benefits of trade liberalisation, the welfare effects of such disciplines are highly 
contingent on the institutional and regulatory capacities of the developing 
countries involved.97 In light of this, the technical assistance and capacity building 
programmes offered by wealthier nations in trade agreements take on a singular 
importance. However, beyond capacity building, trade agreements must tailor 
disciplines impacting on domestic regulations in accordance with the needs and 
peculiarities of developing country signatories.  Such differentiation can be seen in 
the EU’s more flexible approach to the negotiation of regulatory disciplines which 
takes into account the level of development of its trading partners and seems a 
better option than the one-size-fits-all approach adopted in the US DCFTAs. 
Whilst the disciplines imposed by the US vary little from one FTA to another, the 
EU has shown willingness to deviate from its standard template to accommodate 
demands from FTA partners. The disciplines typically included in DCFTAs with 
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developing countries are less onerous than those found in developed country 
DCFTAs and, in one instance, the EU has added regulatory disciplines at the 
specific request of developing nations.98 However, by presenting the TTIP as an 
opportunity to shape the global rules of international trade (or, as the US 
Ambassador to the EU, Anthony Gardener put it, to “set the rules of world trade 
before others do it for us”),99 and the TISA as an agreement that should eventually 
be multilateralised, the EU and the US appear to be going down the one-size-fits-
all approach to disciplining trade in services. Both agreements are driven in part by 
an underlying assumption that others will eventually follow suit. However, as the 
continuous inability of the EU to conclude trade deals with India and Mercosur 
indicates,100 convincing emerging economies to subscribe to rules that further 
undermine their regulatory autonomy and do little to address their most pressing 
concerns is far from a given. It may therefore be that these agreements will not be 
seen as models for the new rules of the international trading system but rather as 
agreements that further entrench the divisions that exist between developed and 
developing countries. In order to avoid the further fragmentation of the 
international trading system, the proponents of the TISA may wish to consider 
incorporating a substantive differentiation mechanism of the type already found in 
the Reference Paper, which, rather than imposing common regulatory frameworks 
en masse, permits developing countries to select which regulatory principles to 
include in their schedules and become legally binding. Such flexibility would 
encourage developing countries to participate in the TISA negotiations and shape 
the future rules of trade in services without the prospect of being bound by 
regulatory disciplines that may run counter to their interests. 
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